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We examine how prior acquisitions and the extent of corporate diversiﬁcation aﬀect decisions to discontinue
operations. These choices comprise a very important class of publicly announced disposal decisions, and
analyzing them allows us to utilize a much larger sample than most prior studies of divestitures. We employ a
multinomial logistic regression setting to test our three hypotheses; this framework allows us to assess the
diﬀerence in choices regarding positive- and negative-valued announcements of discontinued operations. We
ﬁnd that ﬁrms are less liable to report negative-valued divestitures in the year of an acquisition, and are more
likely to discontinue operations, especially with negative values, two and three years after. The eﬀects of the size
of an acquisition on disposal decisions diﬀer sharply between large and small ﬁrms. The magnitude of an
acquisition has little inﬂuence on subsequent divestiture choices by smaller enterprises. However, large
companies are more likely to make positive-valued discontinuations in the year of and year following a major
acquisition, which is consistent with the view that valuable but unwanted units are often shed soon after large
complex acquisitions. We ﬁnd strong support for the Corporate Focus Hypothesis, positing that highly diverse
ﬁrms are more likely to divest assets. We also show that when a company announces its ﬁrst discontinued
operation, this normally follows a period of increasing corporate diversiﬁcation, and the majority of subsequent
disposals take place as intermediate steps in a down-sizing process.
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1. Introduction
Dranikoﬀ, Koller, and Schneider (2002) and Brauer (2006) note that
divestures are among the most important business decisions; however,
they have received far less attention in the literature than acquisitions.
We aim to contribute to the understanding of why, when and how
managers choose to divest. While most prior empirical studies are based
on small samples because they rely on public announcements of asset
sales, which are rare, we focus on discontinued operations, which
provide a much larger sample and represent clearly identiﬁable
strategic choices, encompassing various kinds of disposal decisions.
These occurrences are also particularly interesting as they can take
either positive or negative values, which reveal some information on
whether the disposal is a strongly or poorly performing unit.
We examine three aspects of divestiture decision-making. First, we
provide a detailed analysis of the interrelationship between acquisitions
and subsequent announcements of discontinued operations. Second, we
ask whether the extent of corporate diversiﬁcation drives the choice to
downsize. This question is directly related to the focus hypothesis,
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which posits that a major reason for ﬁrms to divest operations is overlywide corporate diversiﬁcation. Third, we examine whether announcements of discontinued operations represent the beginning of a process
of sharpening corporate focus, or the culmination of actions leading to
less diversiﬁed and more manageable operations. We employ a series of
multinomial logistic regression models to test our hypotheses. The
dependent variable is arranged into three discrete classes so that we
may assess diﬀerences between ﬁrms that announce positive- or
negative-valued discontinued operations.
Porter (1987) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) show that
corporate acquisitions are often followed by divestitures. There has
been a good deal of research indicating that the disposal of these assets
is the result of misguided investments (Bergh, 1997; Capron,
Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 2001; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994;
Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992; Kruse, 2002). In contrast, Weston (1989) and
Bergh (1997) note that a signiﬁcant number of divestitures feature the
disposal of valuable but unwanted operating units following a large
acquisition. Hamilton and Chow (1993) and Dranikoﬀ et al. (2002) note
that most managers view disposals as important strategic choices about
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motivation to dispose of ancillary units. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with
high leverage, low proﬁtability and Tobin's Q, and that are in danger of
bankruptcy are more likely to engage in discontinued operations. In
addition, smaller ﬁrms are more likely to dispose of operations.
Collectively, these results suggest that when the extent of diversiﬁcation becomes unmanageable or ﬁrms cannot exploit the economies of
scale of diversiﬁcation, managers tend to divest marginal assets to focus
on core operations.
For our third hypothesis, we examine the relationship between
recent changes in corporate focus and decisions to discontinue operations. There is clear evidence that ﬁrms are more likely to divest an
operation if they have altered their strategic focus within the previous
three-year period. Our base model shows that ﬁrms that discontinue
operations are more likely to have been sharpening their corporate
focus in the recent past. However, when we examine a smaller sample
of companies, that have made only a single divestiture, we ﬁnd that a
greater proportion of these have expanded diversiﬁcation in the
previous three years. The ﬁndings suggest that a ﬁrst divestiture is
generally a response to perceived over-diversiﬁcation, while subsequent disposals represent continued progress toward a more optimal
corporate structure.
We contribute to the prior literature in the following ways. First,
earlier research on the focus hypothesis uses small samples based on
publicly announced asset sales (Comment & Jarrell, 1995; John & Ofek,
1995). We show that reports of discontinued operations are associated
with more general corporate focus decisions. This is an important
extension of the prior literature because the broader category will allow
future researchers to collect much larger samples to conduct empirical
analyses of managers' down-sizing decisions.
Second, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between
acquisitions and disposal decisions that helps to clarify some of the
motives for positive-valued divestitures (Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992;
Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Porter, 1987; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).
Our ﬁndings show that (a) positive-valued disposals often follow
acquisitions, because acquirers are often seeking very speciﬁc technologies, and that (b) large ﬁrms are more likely to report positive-valued
disposals immediately following major acquisitions.
Third, we are the ﬁrst to show that the typical announcement of a
discontinued operation occurs in the middle of the restructuring
process. Entities that engage in discontinued operations have often
decreased their diversiﬁcation in recent years. However, ﬁrms that
report discontinued operations for the ﬁrst time generally have been
increasing diversiﬁcation in the recent past. This seems to suggest that
there may be an optimal level of complexity and scope of operations
that managers are seeking to achieve and maintain. We believe our
study is the ﬁrst to document this type of ongoing quest for the correct
level of diversiﬁcation.
Lastly, our evidence clearly indicates that information contained in
discontinued operations captures important changes in corporate
strategy, such as increased focus on core operations, and the acquisition
or abandonment of speciﬁc technologies. This supports the contentions
of Dranikoﬀ et al. (2002) and Brauer (2006), and provides a managerial
decision perspective to existing accounting research on discontinued
operations that focuses more on reporting mechanisms (Barua,
Lin, & Sbnaraglia, 2010; Curtis, McVay, & Wolfe, 2014).
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In the next
section, we provide some background information on discontinued
operations. Then, we examine the historical relationship between
acquisitions and discontinued operations using aggregate data, discuss
the background literature and develop our hypotheses. In the ﬁfth
section, we deﬁne our explanatory variables, and then describe the data
and present univariate statistics. In the seventh section, we describe our
multinomial logistic regression speciﬁcation, and discuss the parameter
estimates and some sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our
results. Finally, we conclude and summarize our ﬁndings.

the optimal use of resources. The complexity of the interrelationship
between acquisitions and divestitures is underscored by anecdotal
evidence from recent choices by Motorola, Google and Lenovo. They
represent the sale of an unwanted but valuable unit soon after an
acquisition, for a gain, and the subsequent divestiture of another unit
for a loss after it was deemed unsuccessful.
In January 2011, Motorola spun-oﬀ its mobile device and set-top
box division as Motorola Mobility. In August of the same year, Google
purchased the new entity for $12.5 billion. Google's main interest was
to acquire Motorola Mobility's portfolio of patents, which were related
to Android devices. Google was not interested in the set-top box
operation, and so quickly arranged to sell that division to Arris Group
for $2.35 billion (Savitz, 2012). The total reported value of discontinued operations from the gain on the sale of the unit was $757
million. Within one year, Google sold the mobile phone assets to
Lenovo after disappointing sales of the Motorola Moto X-Phone, but
retained the vast bulk of the patents (Miller & Gelles, 2014). This
example clearly demonstrates that acquisitions and disposals often go
hand-in-hand, which motivates our investigation of whether divestitures tend to follow acquisitions.
There is earlier empirical evidence that disposal decisions are often
the result of earlier over-diversiﬁcation. As a ﬁrm's operations become
more diverse, it can be progressively more diﬃcult for the management
team to oversee the disparate units. Ineﬃcient and nonproductive
segments can also siphon resources away from proﬁtable or strategically important core assets. In early work on the subject, Comment and
Jarrell (1995) and John and Ofek (1995) ﬁnd that widely diversiﬁed
ﬁrms, tend to perform poorly and are more likely to divest operations.
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) dub this proposition the
Corporate Focus Hypothesis. Therefore, our second question is whether
the extent of corporate diversiﬁcation drives the choice to downsize
through discontinued operations.
Our third question concerns management's response to the recognition that diversiﬁcation has become untenable. In some cases, a
divestiture might be the ﬁrst sign of such realization or, if corporate
focus were already narrowing, the action might be one in a chain. While
ﬁrms may engage in gradual restructuring activities to improve
performance (Atiase, Platt, & Tse, 2004), discontinuing an operating
unit requires a more substantial and unwavering commitment to a
strategy. Once a unit is sold or abandoned, it is much more diﬃcult to
rebuild an operation. We examine how recent changes in diversiﬁcation
may aﬀect managers' decisions to discontinue operations.
With regard to our ﬁrst hypothesis, concerning the interrelationship
between acquisitions and subsequent announcements of discontinued
operations, we ﬁnd that, in the year of an acquisition, companies are
generally less likely to discontinue negative-valued operations. Firms
that make large acquisitions are more liable to announce positivevalued discontinued operations in that same year. However, both
positive and negative-valued divestitures are most common two or
three years following an acquisition.
There are interesting diﬀerences between large and small companies. For small ﬁrms, the size of an acquisition has little eﬀect on
contemporaneous or subsequent divestitures, while large entities are far
more likely to divest positive-valued operations in the years of and after
an acquisition. Larger ﬁrms are also less prone to dispose of negativevalued assets two or three years after an acquisition. Overall, our
ﬁndings support the proposition of Weston (1989) and Bergh (1997)
that ﬁrms quickly divest unwanted divisions in acquisitions of large
complex organizations, and later dispose of acquired assets that they
have come to view as unsuccessful investments. This is also consistent
with the anecdotal evidence from Google's sequence of divestitures of
the assets of Motorola Mobility.
We ﬁnd that more widely diversiﬁed organizations are far more
likely to discontinue operations. This supports the Corporate Focus
Hypothesis that decreasing company diversiﬁcation is a powerful
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3. Economy-wide trends in acquisitions and discontinued
operations

2. Discontinued operations
Discontinued operations are disposals of speciﬁc assets or operations that represent an important reallocation of resources within a ﬁrm
(Collins & Henning, 2004). When a company divests an operation, it
must report income or loss from the unit on its income statement below
income from continuing operations, to indicate that these activities
diﬀer from those generated by ongoing operations. The reported value
consists of three basic components: (1) the proﬁts or losses generated by
the unit in the operating year, (2) the capital gain or loss on the sales or
disposal of the unit, and (3) the tax eﬀects.
A discontinued operation must be a separate major line or geographical segment that can be clearly distinguished operationally and for
ﬁnancial reporting purposes. It can be a (1) reportable or operating
segment, (2) reporting unit, (3) subsidiary, or (4) asset group
(Henry & Holzmann, 2010). The parent ﬁrm cannot maintain any
signiﬁcant ongoing involvement in the divested unit, and it may be
divested entirely or in a piecemeal fashion.1 Generally, activities such
as closing facilities, abandoning products or even product lines, and
changing the size of the work force in response to market forces should
not be reported as discontinued operations (there are tests to allow
these if their impacts are signiﬁcant).2 Furthermore, when a ﬁrm
decides to discontinue a component, but the operation has not yet
been sold, the company must estimate its value, and it is then recorded
as “held for sale”. If the book value is more than market value, an
impairment loss is booked. As a result, reports of discontinued operations often give slightly imprecise information on the value of the
divested asset or its sale price. It is likely because of their aggregated
nature and the perception that they represent transitory earnings that
discontinued operations have been largely overlooked in the prior
literature.
Two recent studies investigate whether executives use this item to
manage earnings. Barua et al. (2010) ﬁnd that companies shift
operating expenses to discontinued operations to meet analysts' benchmarks. However, Curtis et al. (2014) ﬁnd no compelling evidence of
discontinued operations being used as vehicles for earnings management. They show that recent changes in the regulatory deﬁnition (SFAS
No. 144) have aﬀected the persistence of earnings; however, why and
how managers make this type of disposal decisions remains largely
unknown.
We feel that, despite the inexact nature of the reports of discontinued operations, it is safe to assume that positive-valued divestiture
announcements represent units that are proﬁtable and/or are sold for
signiﬁcant capital gain. We also believe that the opposite holds true for
negative-valued reports. At the extreme, most abandonments will have
negative values; the jettisoned unit is probably unproﬁtable, and there
is also a loss on any book value of the assets. Jensen (1993) and Brauer
(2006) suggest that decisions about diversiﬁcation strategies and
divestitures are important corporate commitments, and asset dispositions can provide valuable insight on managerial past and forward
looking resource allocation choices. However, current accounting
research on discontinued operations mainly focuses on how investors
perceive the announcements or whether managers manipulate earnings
through reporting rather than on the kinds of strategic changes that are
reﬂected in the decisions.

Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Mulherin and Boone (2000),
Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001) and Brealey and Myers (2003,
pp. 953–954) provide evidence of historical waves in mergers and
acquisition activities. Because many argue that divestitures follow
acquisitions, we are interested in whether asset disposals track these
same patterns. Fig. 1 shows the evolution in the portion of all ﬁrms in
the North American Compustat sample from 1971 to 2012 that make an
acquisition or discontinue an operation. Acquisitions rise more dramatically over the forty-year horizon, but the ﬁgure provides visual
evidence that the two activities are related: the correlation between
the two is over 63%. We also estimate the correlations between
discontinued operations and three years of lags in acquisitions. All
have correlation values well over 60%, providing strong circumstantial
evidence at the macro-level that decisions to discontinue operations
follow waves in acquisitions.
In Fig. 2, we examine the magnitude of the acquisitions and
discontinued operations between 1971 and 2012. The values presented
are the median of the ratio of reported acquisition or divestiture activity
to revenues for all ﬁrms that take one of the actions during the ﬁscal
year.3 The sample of acquisitions contains only the enterprises that
make such a purchase in the year. Including only ﬁrms that undertake a
speciﬁc action allows us to calculate averages and compare diﬀerences
in the magnitudes of the reports. For graphical purposes, we take the
absolute value of the ratio of acquisition/divestiture activity to
revenues for enterprises reporting negative-valued operations.
Clearly, large acquisitions are clustered into distinct periods in the
mid-1980s, late 1990s and, to a lesser extent, before the severe market
contraction in 2007. This clustering is consistent with time frames for
merger waves found in the earlier literature. The visual evidence in
Fig. 2 suggests the magnitude of aggregate positive and negative-valued
discontinued operations follow these waves, especially for the ﬁrst two
cycles. There are strong and signiﬁcant correlations between the
magnitudes of discontinued operations and current and prior levels of
acquisitions. Although untabulated, the correlation between the magnitudes of negative-valued divestitures and contemporaneous acquisitions is over 46%, and well over 50% for acquisitions in prior years,
particularly in the case of divestitures occurring two and three years
after acquisitions.4 The relationship between the magnitude of positivevalued discontinued operations and acquisitions is even stronger. The
correlation is about 73% in the year of the divestiture and two years
prior, over 78% for the year before, and 65% three years after the
disposal. These results lend credence to the conviction of Weston
(1989) and Bergh (1997) that divestitures of valuable, but unwanted
units follow soon after an acquisition, and then those of assets that do
not meet expectations come years later.

4. Development of the hypotheses and background literature
In this section, we develop three sets of hypotheses on the factors
that lead to decisions to discontinue operations. The ﬁrst concerns
whether these choices are related to recent acquisitions. The others
involve the extent of corporate diversiﬁcation and timing of changes in
this diversity. All three propositions are derived from streams of
literature in ﬁnance, economics, accounting, and management.

1
The reporting is more complex if the ﬁrm decides to dispose of the asset in the next
operating period (or periods), or if the divestiture will occur over several years. In these
circumstances, there will be reports during a number of accounting cycles. In addition,
ﬁrms often make revisions to the original amount reported in later years. For a reasonably
clear practical example, see the discussion in the 2012 Annual Report by Becton,
Dickinson and Company on the sale of its Biosciences Division.
2
This is the deﬁnition under SFAS No. 144 that was in place from 2002 until 2014,
which represents most of our study period. It was supplanted by a new standard in 2014
(FASB, 2014, p. 1). But, the basic framework of the deﬁnition is similar.

3
Including the non-reporting ﬁrms, which have values of zero, will lower the median
and mean statistics signiﬁcantly.
4
We did not include the correlation estimates in a table because later we present
results for logit regression speciﬁcations that provide more information about the
relationship of discontinued operations with current and prior acquisitions.
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Fig. 1. Portion of ﬁrms discontinuing operations and acquisitions.

Fig. 2. Ratio of acquisitions and discontinued operations to revenues.

there are many reasons to divest an acquired unit. Weston (1989) and
Bergh (1997) argue that ﬁrms often desire some of the assets of a target,
but not all. In such cases, it is common to sell immediately units that do
not ﬁt into the planned corporate structure. Examples include recent
acquisition and divestiture activities of Motorola, Google and Lenovo
discussed earlier.
The visual evidence in Figs. 1 and 2 suggests that there are
contemporaneous and lagged relationships between the portion of the

4.1. Acquisitions
Porter (1987), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Kaplan and
Weisbach (1992), Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Basu (2010) ﬁnd
that acquisitions are often followed by divestitures. These earlier
studies led to research about whether divestitures result from poor
acquisition choices (Bergh, 1997; Capron et al., 2001; Hoskisson et al.,
1994; Kruse, 2002). Dranikoﬀ et al. (2002) and Brauer (2006) note that
74
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ﬁrms making acquisitions and the magnitude of the purchases with
decisions to discontinue operations. Therefore, we develop two related
hypotheses on the relationship between discontinued operations and
acquisitions. The ﬁrst concerns the timing of divestitures following an
acquisition.

and then begin to divest units. Basu (2010) ﬁnds that soon after a burst
of diversiﬁcation, many ﬁrms reverse their decisions. Kaplan and
Weisbach (1992) ﬁnd that about 40% of acquisitions made from 1971
to 1982 end-up as divestures by 1989. Therefore, a competing hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1A. Firms that make acquisitions in the current and prior
years are most likely to discontinue operations.
The second concerns how the magnitude of the acquisition aﬀects
the disposal decision.

Hypothesis 3A. Firms where diversiﬁcation has recently increased are
most likely to discontinue an operation.
Alternatively, managers may have already begun to undo overextension, such that their current divestiture is merely another step in
the on-going narrowing of corporate focus. Accounting researchers
often view divestitures as isolated (transitory) events (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, & Shevlin, 2002; Fairﬁeld,
Sweeney, & Yohn, 1996), but they may be a part of broader restructuring activities. Dittmar and Shivadasani (2003) and Denis, Denis, and
Sarin (1997) show that divestitures are often proceeded by other
restructuring events such as management turnovers or mergers.
Matsusaka (2001) provides accounts of ﬁve companies, each going
through a cycle of acquisition and divestiture that took place over a
period of 30 years, indicating that restructuring can be a protracted
process. Brauer and Schimmer (2010) suggest that divestitures may be a
learning process wherein managers implement a series of changes as
their strategy evolves. Therefore, the ﬁnal competing hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1B. Firms that make large acquisitions in the current and
prior years are most likely to discontinue operations.
4.2. Extent of corporate diversiﬁcation
Managers often discuss disposing of ancillary divisions to concentrate on their core business operations. Prior research by Comment and
Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995) and Daley et al. (1997), identiﬁes
corporate focus as an important reason for divestiture decisions. These
studies generally rely on small samples to examine asset sales and spinoﬀs. By concentrating on announcements of discontinued operations
derived from annual income statements, we can utilize a much broader
sample, which allows us to generalize the reasons behind managerial
disposal decisions.
Our approach also allows us to assess whether ﬁrms that are trying
to sharpen corporate focus are more likely to discontinue positive- or
negative-valued operations. There may be an interrelationship between
poor performance and the incentive to sharpen corporate focus. For
example, John and Ofek (1995) argue asset sales help a corporation to
focus its business by improving investment policy. Maksimovic and
Phillips (2002) ﬁnd that successful conglomerates exploit the economic
return to scale by utilizing their superior general ability, and these ﬁrms
are relatively large. Dittmar and Shivadasani (2003) show that eﬃciency in investment improves after divestitures. More recently,
Warusawitharana (2008) also ﬁnds evidence that asset sales are
strongly associated with weak operating performance. All these results
indicate that the realization of the poor performance of previous
investment strategies can trigger a focus strategy.
It might seem that poorly-performing entities would be more likely
to divest failing operations with negative values; however, there is no
clear reason that these ﬁrms would divest only negative-valued units.
When tighter focus is a main objective, an entity must evaluate its
strengths and weaknesses, and this may result in disposition of positiveas well as negative-valued lines. Especially for large ﬁrms, rational
decisions about asset disposals are critical to avoid suboptimal expansion into areas where they have limited expertise to fully exploit their
comparative advantage. Hence, our corporate focus hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 3B. Firms where diversiﬁcation has recently decreased are
most likely to discontinue an operation.
It is important to take some care in testing this third set of
hypotheses. Firms often report multiple discontinued operations over
several years, in close proximity. Sometimes these are adjustments to
earlier estimates. But, often a number of divestitures follow closely
upon an earlier disposal. Therefore, we attempt to assess diﬀerences in
the results for ﬁrms that announce only a single discontinued operation.
5. Description of explanatory variables
We employ a series of multinomial logistic regression speciﬁcations
to test our hypotheses. The dependent variables are multinomial
indicators that a ﬁrm has discontinued an operation. We include twelve
explanatory variables to test our three propositions, and another seven
independent factors as control variables. Most of the explanatory
factors are measures over several years before the decision to make
the divestiture. This structure is an important element of our empirical
design, as the lagged values of the independent variables help to
mitigate endogeneity issues, because measures from prior years are less
likely to be inﬂuenced by the factors driving the present divestiture
decision.
5.1. Variables to test our hypotheses
In our ﬁrst hypothesis, we test whether there is a distinct association
between divestitures and either contemporaneous or prior acquisitions.
We also examine whether there are clear patterns in reports of disposals
with positive or negative values following acquisitions. We create two
sets of variables to examine the eﬀects of acquisitions on subsequent
divestitures. The ﬁrst are four one/zero dummy variables set to one if
the ﬁrm makes an acquisition in the same year as the announced
discontinued operation, D-ACQ, or any of three preceding years, L1DACQ, L2D-ACQ, and L3D-ACQ. We employ the other four variables to
examine the eﬀect of the magnitude of the acquisition on the divestiture
decision. To do so, we calculate the ratio of the announced size of the
acquisitions (in the statement of cash ﬂows) to revenues for the
contemporaneous and each of the three preceding years, ACQ-REV,
L1ACQ-REV, L2ACQ-REV, and L3ACQ-REV.
Our second hypothesis concerns the eﬀect of corporate diversiﬁcation on the decision to discontinue an operation. As a proxy, following
Scherer and Ravenscraft (1984), we calculate a Herﬁndahl Index for
each ﬁrm in each ﬁscal year. This index is the sum of the squared values

Hypothesis 2. Firms with highly diverse operations are most likely to
discontinue either negative or positive-valued operations.
4.3. Changes in corporate diversiﬁcation
Our third question is whether discontinued operations are part of an
on-going corporate restructuring process, or if over-diversiﬁcation leads
to disposal decisions. There may be some optimal level of complexity of
ﬁrm operations, and managers may be trying to achieve such an
equilibrium given current conditions. However, since this calibration
is a slow and evolving process, it is diﬃcult to identify individual
divestiture decisions as exercises in optimization. Rather, the actions
may be intermediate steps in a ﬂow of restructuring activities.
We develop two alternative hypotheses about changes in the extent
of corporate diversiﬁcation in the years leading-up to a disposal.
Diversiﬁcation may eventually drain resources away from other proﬁtable operations. At some point, managers of an enterprise that has been
diversifying rapidly might see that this strategy is counterproductive,
75
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variable, SPI, set to one if a ﬁrm reports a special item in Compustat6
in the contemporaneous or any of the three prior years. In accordance
with their ﬁndings, we expect that this variable will be positively
associated with the probability that a ﬁrm will discontinue an operation.
We employ measures of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks based on the Altman ZScore. Altman (1968) developed the following model of the probability
of bankruptcy for manufacturing ﬁrms:
Z′ = 1.2 (WC / TA) + 1.4 (RE / TA) + 3.3 (EBIT / TA) + 0.6
(BVEQ / BVLIAB) + 1.0 (REV / TA).7
Altman proposed three “zones” for the probability of bankruptcy. If
the Z-Score is less than 1.80, the ﬁrm is in danger of bankruptcy. If is
greater than 2.99, the entity is considered safe. Between these two
values he classiﬁes the ﬁrms as “ignore.” Because the original Z-Score
model was designed to assess manufacturing ﬁrms, Altman (1983) later
proposed a second revised model for non-manufacturing ﬁrms:
Z″ = 6.56 (WC / TA) + 3.26 (RE / TA) + 6.72 (EBIT / TA) + 1.05
(BVEQ / BVLIAB).
In this speciﬁcation, a ﬁrm is considered in danger if the score is less
than 1.10, and is safe if it is higher than 2.60. We estimate the
appropriate Altman Z-Score for each observation. For manufacturing
enterprises (SIC codes 3000–4999), we use the original speciﬁcation,
and for all other entities, we use the revised model. To capture the risks
that a ﬁrm faces, we create two one/zero dummy variables. One, SAFE,
if the estimated Z-Score for the entity is above the speciﬁed value for
the model as described above, and the other, DANGER, if it is below the
recommended value for such observations.
Finally, the business cycle may aﬀect the decision to discontinue an
operation. Our proxy for macroeconomic conditions is the annual
percentage change in real per capita gross domestic product
(CHRPCGDP), which we collect from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
In earlier studies, Duhaime and Grant (1984) and Ilmakunnas and Topi
(1999) contend that divestitures should be more common during
recessions, but they ﬁnd little evidence in support of that argument.
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) advance their Liquidity
Hypothesis, suggesting that ﬁrms should be reluctant to dispose of units
at ﬁre-sale prices in economic downturns, and Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) provide empirical evidence of
the anticipated cyclical nature of asset sales.

of the ratio of sales for each operating unit to total ﬁrm sales. For a ﬁrm
with N units, the relationship is as follows.
N

HERF = Σ (si S )2
i =1

The value of the index decreases as the entity is more operationally
diverse. For instance, if a ﬁrm has two divisions that both contribute
50% of sales, the value of the index is 0.50 (0.25 + 0.25). For a less
diversiﬁed ﬁrm, where one unit contributes 90% of revenues and the
other 10%, the index value is higher 0.82 (0.81 + 0.01). If the measure
has a value of one, the ﬁrm is completely undiversiﬁed. This proxy is
used in earlier studies by John and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell
(1995), Berger and Ofek (1999) and Dittmar and Shivadasani (2003).
Our explanatory variable to test the hypothesis, HI, is the average value
of this index for the three years before the announcement of a
discontinued operation.
In the third hypothesis, we test how recent changes in diversiﬁcation aﬀect decisions to discontinue operations. Therefore, we ﬁrst
calculate the change in the Herﬁndahl Index over the prior three years.
Since we hope to understand diﬀerences between ﬁrms that are
increasing or decreasing corporate focus, we create two one/zero
dummy variables to capture these directional changes; the ﬁrst is set
to one if diversiﬁcation is decreasing, HI-CH-INC, the second if it is
increasing, HI-CH-DEC (recall that increasing value of the Herﬁndahl
Index implies less diversiﬁcation and vice versa). Because focus cannot
increase for ﬁrms that are undiversiﬁed, we create a third dummy
variable, HI-DEC-SUN, set to one if diversiﬁcation has decreased at a
ﬁrm that had a Herﬁndahl Index value of one four years in the past.
This will show how choices at these previously undiversiﬁed entities
diﬀer from others that have changed their focus in recent years.
5.2. Control variables
We include eight control variables in our models. Hoskisson et al.
(1994), Bergh (1997), Capron et al. (2001), Kruse (2002) and
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walking (2002) ﬁnd that weak performance
explains many corporate divestitures. Therefore, we include three
performance measures, one based on earnings, another on leverage
and the third on market performance. The ﬁrst is the average return on
assets (ROA) over the previous three years, which captures the general
proﬁtability. The second is a measure of ﬁnancial leverage (LEV), the
ratio of total liabilities to assets. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) and
Allen and McConnell (1998) show that ﬁrms facing greater ﬁnancial
constraints are more likely to dispose of assets to raise needed cash. The
third control variable is the average value of Tobin's Q for the three
prior years (TOBINQ), which is a proxy for market participants'
assessment of ﬁrm valuation.
Firm size is often an important determinant of ﬁnancial policies, and
is frequently used as a proxy for ease of access to ﬁnancial markets.
Because the distribution of revenues is often seriously skewed, we
employ an alternative approach suggested by Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999). For each ﬁscal year, we collect the descriptive statistics for the
ﬁrms on Compustat that trade on the nine major North American stock
exchanges.5 We use the mean and standard deviation for each year to
construct a cumulative density function (CDF) of corporate revenue. For
each observation, we ﬁnd the percentage of ﬁrms with lower values of
revenue under the CDF for that year (CDF-REV). These take on a value
between zero and one. For instance, if CDF-REV is 0.90, this ﬁrm is
larger than 90% of the ﬁrms traded on the major exchanges in that
ﬁscal year.
Darrough, Guler, and Wang (2014) ﬁnd that many nonrecurring
items are interrelated. Therefore, we include a one/zero dummy

6. Description of the datasets and unavailable statistics
6.1. Description of the datasets
We collect most of the required data from 1976 through 2012 from
the annual Compustat database. The ﬁgures needed to calculate the
Herﬁndahl Index of corporate diversiﬁcation are taken from the
Historical Segments database in Compustat. These data are only
available from 1976. Because of the required lags to estimate this
variable, a ﬁrm must have observations for at least ﬁve consecutive
years to be included, which limits the beginning of the sample period to
1980. We also remove the entities in the ﬁnancial sector from the
sample (industries 45 through 48 in the Fama and French ﬁfty
industrial classiﬁcations). After eliminating observations with missing
values for the variables used in the study, we are left with an
unconstrained sample of 123,415 ﬁrm-year observations. Of these,
8895 announce negative-valued discontinuations, and 7000 with
positive values. In the three years prior the divestiture, the level of
6
Special Items is an entry created by S & P and presented on Compustat. It represents
“any signiﬁcant non-recurring item.” These include losses from ﬂood, ﬁre and natural
disasters, restructuring or reorganization costs, and write-downs or write-oﬀs of
receivables and intangibles, along with many other items.
7
The explanatory variables in Altman's (1968) model are the ratios of (1) working
capital, (2) retained earnings, (3) earnings before interest and taxes, and (4) revenues all
to the book value of assets. The ﬁfth is the book value of equity to liabilities.

5
These are the Toronto, Montreal and Alberta Stock Exchanges in Canada, and the
New York, American, Boston, Midwest, Paciﬁc and Philadelphia Exchanges in the United
States.
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corporate diversiﬁcation, as measured by a Herﬁndahl Index, decreased
at 28,053 of the ﬁrms, increased for 30,142, and of these 20,315 of
these were single-unit operation before the changes in corporate focus
began. Of the total, 35,651 made external acquisitions in the contemporaneous or three previous years.
We also employ a matching technique, used in earlier studies Berger
and Ofek (1999), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Dittmar
and Shivadasani (2003), to control for year, industry and ﬁrm size. In
our setting, there are several beneﬁts to selecting a matched sample for
comparison. It helps to control for diﬀerences in behavior across
industries. It also accounts for temporal eﬀects, including changes in
macroeconomic and equity market conditions. As an added beneﬁt, this
approach can reduce endogeneity problems (Colak & Whited, 2007).
We use four criteria to choose these pairings. First, the observation
must be in the same Fama-French industry sector and the same ﬁscal
year as the ﬁrm that discontinues an operation. Next, their value of
total assets in the year before must be within 20% of the target ﬁrms.
After matching on these three criteria, we eliminate all potential
matches that discontinue an operation in the three proceeding or
subsequent years.8 This criterion assures that the chosen control ﬁrm
is not involved in divestiture activities in the same time-window as the
treatment ﬁrm. Of the remaining potential matches, one is chosen at
random to ensure that there are no repeated matches for any ﬁscal year
and industry. This yields a sample of 13,117 pairs, for a total sample
size of 26,234 ﬁrm-year observations. Of the ﬁrms that report discontinued operations, 7383 are of negative values, and 5734 have positive
values.

Table 1
Univariate statistics matched sample.
Variable

Class

Median

Mean

Std dev

Wilcoxon
rank test

t-Test
mean diﬀ

D-ACQ

Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.6799
0.6420
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0065
0.0169
0.0474
0.5790
0.5845
0.4840
1.2406
1.3210
1.4214
0.5398
0.6047
0.5831
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.3245
0.3722
0.3101
0.0402
0.0667
0.0281
0.6901
0.6627
0.8116
0.3830
0.4489
0.2014
0.3637
0.3457
0.2724
0.2401
0.2558
0.1933
− 0.0469
− 0.0473
0.0177
0.6020
0.6272
0.5199
1.6427
1.7287
1.9415
0.5261
0.5678
0.5562
0.3963
0.3437
0.1922
0.3669
0.4149
0.6174
0.8681
0.8866
0.7457

0.4682
0.4834
0.4626
0.5289
0.8439
0.2433
0.2538
0.2508
0.2432
0.4862
0.4974
0.4011
0.4811
0.4756
0.4452
0.4272
0.4364
0.3949
0.2113
0.2843
0.3350
0.4796
0.5694
0.4714
1.9922
2.2002
2.0237
0.2766
0.2908
0.2820
0.4892
0.4750
0.3940
0.4820
0.4927
0.4860
0.3384
0.3171
0.4355

2.13⁎⁎
8.34⁎⁎⁎

2.12⁎⁎
8.21⁎⁎⁎

1.04
8.32⁎⁎⁎

1.86⁎
3.34⁎⁎⁎

−36.08⁎⁎⁎
−39.81⁎⁎⁎

− 33.41⁎⁎⁎
− 37.83⁎⁎⁎

28.22⁎⁎⁎
34.94⁎⁎⁎

27.30⁎⁎⁎
33.25⁎⁎⁎

13.62⁎⁎⁎
10.15⁎⁎⁎

13.39⁎⁎⁎
9.92⁎⁎⁎

7.90⁎⁎⁎
9.66⁎⁎⁎

7.74⁎⁎⁎
9.31⁎⁎⁎

−45.43⁎⁎⁎
−33.44⁎⁎⁎

− 16.92⁎⁎⁎
− 13.65⁎⁎⁎

25.46⁎⁎⁎
25.23⁎⁎⁎

11.85⁎⁎⁎
12.52⁎⁎⁎

−20.38⁎⁎⁎
−10.48⁎⁎⁎

− 10.25⁎⁎⁎
− 6.26⁎⁎⁎

−7.66⁎⁎⁎
3.08⁎⁎⁎

− 7.43⁎⁎⁎
2.64⁎⁎

31.76⁎⁎⁎
22.47⁎⁎⁎

30.69⁎⁎⁎
21.18⁎⁎⁎

−34.49⁎⁎⁎
−25.75⁎⁎⁎

− 35.62⁎⁎⁎
− 26.07⁎⁎⁎

20.65⁎⁎⁎
21.81⁎⁎⁎

22.36⁎⁎⁎
24.92⁎⁎⁎

Neg DO

7383

Pos DO

5734

No DO

13,117

ACQ-REV

HI

HI-INC

HI-DEC

HI-DEC-SUN

ROA

LEV

TOBINQ

REV_CDF

6.2. Descriptive statistics
DANGER

The univariate statistics for the observations in the matched sample
are given in Table 1. The ﬁrst four columns of the table contain the
number of observations, the median, mean, and the standard deviation
for the thirteen explanatory variables for each of the three classes based
on whether the ﬁrm has discontinued an operation, and if so, whether
the book-value of the divestiture is positive or negative. The last two
columns contain test statistics for the diﬀerences between the two types
of ﬁrms that announce divestitures and those that do not. The ﬁrst is a
nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Test for diﬀerences between two of the
subsamples, which is especially useful if the distributions are skewed.
The other is a t-test for the diﬀerence of the means of the subsamples.
Because the variance often diﬀers between the groups, we use the
Satterthwaite approximation of the t-value.

SAFE

SPI

Observations
⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎
⁎

Signiﬁcant with 1% conﬁdence.
Signiﬁcant with 5% conﬁdence.
Signiﬁcant with 10% conﬁdence.

average index value is about 81%. On the other hand, the averages for
the ﬁrms making disposals are around 65%. The test statistics show that
their diversity, compared to non-divesting entities, is highly statistically
signiﬁcant.
The ﬁgures in Table 1 also support our hypotheses that enterprises
that announce discontinuations are likely to have recently altered their
level of diversity. The control ﬁrms are about 20% more likely to have
decreased their level of diversiﬁcation in the three previous years (HIINC). Entities announcing negative-valued operations are about 38%
more prone to have decreased diversiﬁcation, compared with 44% for
ﬁrms making positive-valued divestitures. So companies reporting
discontinuations seem far more likely to have been sharpening corporate focus in the recent past. About 27% of the control ﬁrms have
recently increased their diversity (HI-DEC), and of these 19% had only a
single operating unit four years prior (HI-DEC-SUN). Diversiﬁcation
increased for 36% of divesting ﬁrms and for 34% of entities announcing
negative and positive-valued discontinued operations respectively;
about 25% of the enterprises where diversiﬁcation decreased were
single-unit ﬁrms four years before.

6.2.1. Variables to test the hypotheses
The test statistics for the measures of acquisition activities generally
support our hypotheses. We only provide statistics for these measures in
the concurrent year, but our logit regressions will provide more
information on the relationships with prior acquisitions. The tests on
the dummy variable, D-ACQ, suggest that the ﬁrms that discontinue an
operation, especially with a positive value, are signiﬁcantly more likely
to make an acquisition. The value for the Wilcoxon Rank test is 8.34, at
a 1% signiﬁcance level, for positive-valued disposals and 2.13, at a 5%
signiﬁcance level, for negative-valued discontinuations. The results for
the measure of the size of acquisitions, ACQ-REV, show that ﬁrms that
announce a positive valued divestiture are much more likely to have
made a recent large acquisition.
As expected, in the years leading-up to a divestiture, the companies
that discontinue an operation are far more diversiﬁed than the control
ﬁrms. The median ﬁrm in the control sample has a Herﬁndahl Index
(HI) of one, meaning that they are completely undiversiﬁed, and the

6.2.2. Control variables
We also test for diﬀerences between divesting and matching ﬁrms
for six of our control variables. The test results tend to support the

8
We do not strictly enforce the rule that the ﬁrm must not recapitalize in the
subsequent three years for observations after 2010. Since three years of data are not
available in these cases, all the observations would be lost if we forced the issue.
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operation, we also compute an “economic eﬀect,” which is the product
of the average marginal eﬀect and the standard deviation of the
predictor variable for the entire sample. This measure shows the
percentage increase (or decrease) in the likelihood that a ﬁrm will
discontinue an operation for a one standard deviation change in the
explanatory factor. There is no reason to compute the economic eﬀect
for the independent dummy variables, which can only take values of
one and zero.
Comparison of the two sets of results shows that the explanatory
power is much higher for the speciﬁcation using the matched sample. It
has an estimated Maximum Rescaled R2 of over 22%, and only 14% for
the speciﬁcation based on the unconstrained sample. In general, the
magnitudes of the marginal and economic eﬀects are greater for the
model based on the matched sample. In the discussion to follow, we will
concentrate on the results for the matched sample, and comment on
those for the unconstrained sample where there are notable diﬀerences.

previous ﬁndings. As expected, the test statistics suggest that the
entities that discontinue an operation have lower return on assets
(ROA) and Tobin's Q (TOBINQ) measures, and higher ﬁnancial leverage
(LEV). Based on our measure of ﬁrm size (REV-CDF), companies that
announce negative-valued divestitures are smaller than the control
sample, and those making positive-valued discontinuations are larger
than average. The divesting ﬁrms are far more likely to have Altman ZScores in the danger zone (DANGER), 40% for negative- and 34% for
positive-valued discontinued operations while the statistic for the
control sample is only 20%. The companies reporting discontinuations
are less liable to be in the safe zone (SAFE). Only about 37% of ﬁrms
reporting negative-valued divestitures and 41% of those making
positive-valued reports are in the safe zone, as compared to 62% for
the control sample. The ﬁrms reporting discontinued operations are
also more likely to have announced other non-recurring items in recent
years (SPI): over 80% for the divesting companies as opposed to 75%
for control ﬁrms.

7.2. Results for the hypotheses tests
7. Logistic regression model speciﬁcations and parameter
estimates

Our ﬁrst set of hypotheses concerns the interrelationship between
acquisitions and discontinued operations. We employ two sets of
variables to study these relationships. The ﬁrst, to test Hypothesis 1A,
is a set of dummy variables coded to one if a ﬁrm reports an acquisition
in either the contemporaneous or the three prior years. The parameter
results on these variables shown in Table 2 display a very interesting
pattern. Firms are over 6% (with a p-value less than 1%) less likely to
announce a negative-valued discontinuation in the year in which they
make an acquisition (D-ACQ). There is no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between those announcing positive-valued divestitures and
the control samples. In the year after an acquisition (L1D-ACQ), entities
are more likely to announce discontinuations of either sign, but the
marginal eﬀects show that the increase in the probabilities is 1% or less.
Then, in the second year after an acquisition (L2D-ACQ), reports of both
positive and negative-valued discontinued operations are 3% or 4%
more common (with a p-value less than 1%), and the eﬀect is even more
pronounced, 5% or 6% (with a p-value less than 1%), three years after
(L3D-ACQ). The marginal eﬀects suggest that negative-valued divestiture are slightly more likely than positive ones in the second and third
years after an acquisition, but there are clearly large groups announcing
discontinued operations of either sign. Collectively, these results show
that negative-valued divestitures are less liable to occur at the time of
an acquisition. The negative reports that occur after two or three years
are likely to be the recognition of failed investments. But, it is
interesting that many ﬁrms also begin to divest positive-valued assets
in the later years.
There is very little evidence in support of Hypothesis 1B showing
that the magnitude of acquisitions in the prior three years (L1ACQ-REV,
L2ACQ-REV or L3ACQ-REV) has a discernable eﬀect on future decisions
to discontinue an operation of either sign. This may be because we use
the cash value of acquisitions that probably does not account for their
full magnitude, which creates a bias against support of our hypothesis
H1B. But, in the contemporaneous year, there is clear evidence that
ﬁrms that make large acquisitions (ACQ-REV) are about 1% more likely
to announce positive-valued divestitures (the p-value is slightly greater
than 5%). This piece of evidence ﬁts very nicely with the stories of
Weston (1989) and Bergh (1997) that ﬁrms making large acquisitions of
diversiﬁed entities are then likely to quickly divest the unwanted
elements of those businesses, as was the case when Google immediately
divested itself of Motorola's set-top box unit after acquiring Motorola
Mobility in 2012.
For ﬁrms that announce a discontinued operation of either sign, the
parameter estimates on the Herﬁndahl Index, HI, for the prior three
years are statistically signiﬁcant and negative. The magnitude of the
coeﬃcients are about −0.80 for both negative and positive-valued
discontinued operations (with p-values less than 1%). Because a lower
value of the index represents greater diversiﬁcation, this result lends

7.1. Logistic regression model speciﬁcation
To test out hypotheses, we estimate a multinomial logistic (logit)
regression model, of the form below, in a multivariate setting to assess
the eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the probability of ﬁrms
announcing a .
DO‐CHOICE = β0 + β1D‐ACQ + β2 D‐L1ACQ + β3D‐L2ACQ + β4 D‐L3ACQ+
β5ACQ‐REV + β6 L1ACQ‐REV + β 7L2ACQ‐REV + β8L3ACQ‐REV+
β9 HI + β10 HI‐INC + β11HI‐DEC + β12 HI‐DEC‐SUN+
β13ROA + β14 LEV + β15TOBINQ + β16 CDF‐REV + β17SPI+
β18DANGER + β198AFE + β20 CHRPCGDP + ε.

We estimate the model using two diﬀerent samples. The dependent
variable is divided into three classes: ﬁrms that do not discontinue an
operation, those that announce a negative-valued divestiture, and
entities reporting positive-valued discontinuations. The enterprises that
do not announce a divestiture are the control group. Therefore, the
estimated parameters show how the two classes of ﬁrms that discontinue an operation diﬀer from those that do not.
The empirical results for our multinomial logistic regression speciﬁcation are shown in Table 2. The ﬁgures in the left-hand panel are
based on a matched sample with an equal number of that discontinue
an operation and that do not. This speciﬁcation controls for year,
industry and size. Firms in the control sample do not report discontinued operation within a seven-year window around the event. The
estimates in the right-hand panel are for the unconstrained sample,
comparing the ﬁrms that discontinue an operation to all available
observations. In this speciﬁcation, we include a variable to capture
macroeconomic conditions to observe their eﬀect on disposal decisions
(CHRPCGDP).
The parameter estimates in a logit model are not directly comparable to those in an OLS regression. In logit, the relationship between the
discrete dependent variable and an explanatory factor diﬀers at every
point along the distribution, and is aﬀected by the values of the other
independent variables. Therefore, we also present a summary of the
“marginal eﬀects” for each coeﬃcient estimate. These represent the
change in the probability of announcing a discontinued operation for a
one-unit change in an explanatory variable. The marginal eﬀects also
diﬀer at every point, so as is common, we present the sample average of
the individual marginal eﬀects.9
To judge the relative magnitude of the eﬀects of the continuous
independent variables on the likelihood that a ﬁrm will discontinue an
9

See Greene (2012, p. 690).
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Table 2
Multinomial logistic regression parameter estimates.
Variable

Intercept
D-ACQ
D-L1ACQ
D-L2ACQ
D-L3ACQ
ACQ-REV
L1ACQ-REV
L2ACQ-REV
L3ACQ-REV
HI
HI-INC
HI-DEC
HI-DEC-SUN
ROA
LEV
TOBINQ
CDF-REV
DANGER
SAFE
D-SPI
CHRPCGDP

Class

Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO

Matched sample

Unconstrained sample

Parameter estimate

Standard error

−0.2591
−1.2489
−0.1804
−0.0326
0.1508
0.0987
0.2753
0.2514
0.3948
0.3482
0.0392
0.1078
−0.0412
−0.0366
−0.0151
0.0323
−0.0473
−0.0492
−0.8531
−0.7799
1.1375
1.4688
0.8265
0.7188
−0.2122
0.1359
−1.1947
−1.2471
0.1681
0.2476
−0.1634
−0.1247
−1.0262
−0.6591
0.3868
0.3097
−0.5170
−0.3600
0.5234
0.6861

0.1246⁎⁎
0.1327⁎⁎⁎
0.0407⁎⁎⁎
0.0432
0.0414⁎⁎⁎
0.0446⁎⁎
0.0410⁎⁎⁎
0.0441⁎⁎⁎
0.0391⁎⁎⁎
0.0421⁎⁎⁎
0.0556
0.0528⁎⁎
0.0414
0.0417
0.0562
0.0539
0.0437
0.0526
0.1021⁎⁎⁎
0.1060⁎⁎⁎
0.0559⁎⁎⁎
0.0598⁎⁎⁎
0.0607⁎⁎⁎
0.0697⁎⁎⁎
0.0634⁎⁎⁎
0.0706⁎
0.0998⁎⁎⁎
0.1019⁎⁎⁎
0.0406⁎⁎⁎
0.0438⁎⁎⁎
0.0132⁎⁎⁎
0.0130⁎⁎⁎
0.0676⁎⁎⁎
0.0726⁎⁎⁎
0.0461⁎⁎⁎
0.0503⁎⁎⁎
0.0422⁎⁎⁎
0.0451⁎⁎⁎
0.0432⁎⁎⁎
0.0494⁎⁎⁎

Observations
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Max rescale
R-square

Marginal eﬀect

−0.0617
−0.0422
0.0103
−0.0047
0.0420
0.0330
0.0677
0.0551
0.0080
0.0173
−0.0057
−0.0070
−0.0004
0.0041
−0.0081
−0.0078
−0.1593
−0.1246
0.1932
0.2089
0.1186
0.0942
−0.0938
−0.0344
−0.2404
−0.2088
0.0288
0.0387
−0.0296
−0.0198
−0.1920
−0.1045
0.0599
0.0505
−0.1362
−0.1166
0.1877
0.2249

Economic eﬀect

0.0041
0.0089
−0.0028
−0.0034
−0.0001
0.0012
−0.0040
−0.0035
−0.0409
−0.0320

−0.0701
−0.0617
0.0144
0.0193
−0.0609
−0.0407
−0.0543
−0.0296

26,234
7383
5734
13,117
0.2212

Parameter estimate

Standard error

− 2.3857
− 3.3907
− 0.1445
− 0.0300
0.1233
0.0413
0.2368
0.2223
0.3348
0.2705
0.0148
0.0377
0.0084
0.0189
− 0.0260
− 0.0087
− 0.0333
− 0.0320
− 1.0958
− 0.9813
1.0449
1.4216
0.8292
0.7394
− 0.0709
0.3011
− 0.1281
− 0.0905
0.0945
0.0175
− 0.1105
− 0.0281
− 0.4161
0.0550
0.3050
0.2767
− 0.3803
− 0.2951
0.5626
0.7223
− 2.6384
− 5.3157
Observations
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Max rescale
R-square

0.0874⁎⁎⁎
0.0966⁎⁎⁎
0.0295⁎⁎⁎
0.0323
0.0303⁎⁎⁎
0.0338
0.0299⁎⁎⁎
0.0334⁎⁎⁎
0.0281⁎⁎⁎
0.0315⁎⁎⁎
0.0173
0.0110⁎⁎⁎
0.0156
0.0139
0.0265
0.0266
0.0230
0.0294
0.0690⁎⁎⁎
0.0736⁎⁎⁎
0.0395⁎⁎⁎
0.0443⁎⁎⁎
0.0438⁎⁎⁎
0.0544⁎⁎⁎
0.0438
0.0526⁎⁎⁎
0.0391⁎⁎⁎
0.0228⁎⁎⁎
0.0114⁎⁎⁎
0.0065⁎⁎⁎
0.0099⁎⁎⁎
0.0075⁎⁎⁎
0.0463⁎⁎⁎
0.0509
0.0310⁎⁎⁎
0.0350⁎⁎⁎
0.0304⁎⁎⁎
0.0330⁎⁎⁎
0.0335⁎⁎⁎
0.0397⁎⁎⁎
0.5750⁎⁎⁎
0.6203⁎⁎⁎

Marginal eﬀect

− 0.0113
− 0.0030
0.0080
0.0020
0.0163
0.0128
0.0231
0.0157
0.0009
0.0019
0.0005
0.0010
− 0.0017
− 0.0004
− 0.0021
− 0.0016
− 0.0700
− 0.0501
0.0683
0.0808
0.0521
0.0382
− 0.0082
0.0129
− 0.0082
− 0.0046
0.0060
0.0009
− 0.0071
− 0.0014
− 0.0266
0.0028
0.0196
0.0140
− 0.0303
− 0.0194
0.0518
0.0575
− 0.1685
− 0.2717
123,415
8895
7000
107,520

Economic eﬀect

0.0069
0.0014
0.0036
0.0006
− 0.0011
− 0.0003
− 0.0035
− 0.0012
− 0.0171
− 0.0122

− 0.0089
− 0.0050
0.0769
0.0114
− 0.1213
− 0.0197
− 0.0080
0.0008

− 0.0033
− 0.0052

0.1411

⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎
⁎

Signiﬁcant with 1% conﬁdence.
Signiﬁcant with 5% conﬁdence.
Signiﬁcant with 10% conﬁdence.

years, HI-INC, are about 20% more likely to discontinue an operation of
either sign than a control ﬁrm, while those where diversity has
increased, HI-DEC, are about 10% more liable to divest a unit of either
sign (both at 1% signiﬁcance levels). This suggests that large numbers
of divesting ﬁrms have been changing corporate focus in either
direction, but that a current discontinued operation is far more likely
to represent a link in a chain of previous divestitures, than to be the
beginning of a move to sharpen corporate focus after a program of
diversifying expansion in recent years.
Firms that had only a single operating unit four years previously and
subsequently diversiﬁed, HI-DEC-SUN, are an interesting case. In the
matched sample, the marginal eﬀects suggest that such enterprises are
9% less prone to announce a current negative-valued discontinued
operation than control ﬁrms. But, when compared to the unconstrained
sample, entities that discontinue a negative-valued operation are not
diﬀerent from the control group. The estimated parameters suggest that

strong support to Hypothesis 2, based on the work of Comment and
Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995) and Daley et al. (1997), who
argue that ﬁrms that divest a unit are more diverse than those that do
not. The economic eﬀects suggest that a one standard deviation decline
in the Herﬁndahl Index (meaning the ﬁrm is more diversiﬁed) indicates
that it is about 3% or 4% more likely to discontinue an operation. These
eﬀects also suggest that more diverse enterprises are slightly more
likely to announce a negative-valued than positive-valued discontinued
operation.
To test our third hypothesis, we include three one/zero dummy
variables to examine how previous corporate diversiﬁcation actions
aﬀect current decisions to discontinue operations. Firms where the level
of diversiﬁcation has changed in the past are far more likely to
announce a divestiture in the current period. But, the marginal eﬀects
show that there is a vast diﬀerence based on the direction of past
changes. Firms where diversiﬁcation has decreased over the past three
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previously undiversiﬁed companies that announce positive-valued
discontinued operation are 1% more liable to increase diversiﬁcation
than control ﬁrms.10

Table 3
Distribution of reports of discontinued operations by ﬁrm and Compustat observations
per ﬁrm.

7.3. Subsidiary results on Hypothesis 3
It is possible that these tests of our third hypothesis shown in
Table 2 may be somewhat misleading. It is not uncommon for ﬁrms to
announce a series of discontinued operations over a period of several
years. Sometimes, these may simply be adjustments to the original
reported amount. But, occasionally a company will undergo a ﬂurry of
discontinuations over several years. The prevalence of such activities
could conceivably account for our ﬁndings that discontinued operations
are more likely to occur after diversiﬁcation has already begun to
decline.
To mitigate the inﬂuence of ﬁrms that announce frequent discontinued operations, we conduct a further test using a smaller sample.
Prior research shows that multiple reports of restructuring activities
send diﬀerent signals to markets than do isolated actions (Cready,
Lopez, & Sisneros, 2010; Khurana & Lippincott, 2000).
The distribution of the number of reports of discontinued operations
by ﬁrms over the time they are included in the Compustat database is
given in Table 3. For comparison, we also include the distribution of the
number of observations per ﬁrm (recall that an entity must have at least
ﬁve consecutive observations to be included). About 62% of the total
observations, 8054 entities, do not report discontinued operations. Of
the 5017 ﬁrms that announce discontinued operations, 1728 report
only once, meaning that 3289 make multiple divestitures. A handful of
ﬁrms report very frequently; 28 companies announce discontinued
operations over 14 times during their lives.
For this speciﬁcation, we eliminate all ﬁrms that announce more
than a single discontinued operation in the Compustat database. This
assures that any reported disposal cannot be part of an ongoing chain of
publically announced divestitures. We collect a matched sample from
the universe of ﬁrms that never discontinue an operation. Again, the
matches are drawn from the same Fama-French industry sector, in the
same ﬁscal year, and are of roughly the same size as the discontinuing
entities. This results in a much smaller sample with 1788 observations
(547 announce a negative-valued discontinued operation, 347 make
positive-valued divestitures, and there are 894 control ﬁrms).
We do not present the results in tabular form, but we will
concentrate on the ﬁndings for the three dummy variables to test the
second hypothesis (HI-INC, HI-DEC and HI-DEC-SUN).11 The explanatory power of the model is still respectable, the Maximum Rescaled R2 is
still over 15%, but because of the small sample size, fewer of the
parameter estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcient estimates on HI-INC and HI-DEC for ﬁrms that
announce both positive and negative–valued discontinued operations
are still positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant as in Table 2. But,
the marginal eﬀects tell a diﬀerent story. Firms where diversiﬁcation
has been decreasing (HI-INC) are about 14% more liable to discontinue
an operation. But now, the companies where diversiﬁcation has been
increasing (HI-DEC) are more likely to report a divestiture. Those
announcing negative-valued discontinued operations are over 23%
more prone to have increased diversiﬁcation, and those making
positive-valued divestitures are almost 20% more likely. Again, the
portion of ﬁrms making negative and positive divestitures is of almost
the same magnitude.
The results for HI-DEC-SUN are somewhat similar to those in
Table 2. Firms that announce negative-valued discontinued operations

Number of
reports of
DO

Number of
ﬁrms

Percentage

Years listed
on Compustat

Number of
ﬁrms

Percentage

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

8054
1728
1111
641
448
295
223
154
110
89
68
52
26
30
14
5
4
5
3
1
3
4
2
1

61.62%
13.22%
8.50%
4.90%
3.43%
2.26%
1.71%
1.18%
0.84%
0.68%
0.52%
0.40%
0.20%
0.23%
0.11%
0.04%
0.03%
0.04%
0.02%
0.01%
0.02%
0.03%
0.02%
0.01%

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Total

13,071

100%

1386
1260
1102
951
885
739
650
612
555
534
378
366
351
354
317
257
284
224
215
169
146
127
118
110
88
99
81
68
79
56
113
156
241
13,071

10.60%
9.64%
8.43%
7.28%
6.77%
5.65%
4.97%
4.68%
4.25%
4.09%
2.89%
2.80%
2.69%
2.71%
2.43%
1.97%
2.17%
1.71%
1.64%
1.29%
1.12%
0.97%
0.90%
0.84%
0.67%
0.76%
0.62%
0.52%
0.60%
0.43%
0.86%
1.19%
1.84%
100%

and where diversiﬁcation has been increasing, are far less likely to have
been completely undiversiﬁed four years earlier. On the other hand, for
companies that report positive-valued discontinued operations under
this speciﬁcation, the estimates on the parameter are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Again, for many ﬁrms that report a discontinued operation,
diversiﬁcation is either increasing or decreasing over the three prior
years. But, after controlling for possible series of tightly-timed announcements, divestitures are somewhat more common among those
where the corporation was less focused in the past. So, the overall
results suggest that isolated discontinuations follow periods of (over-)
diversiﬁcation, while a sequence of actions tightening corporate focus
tends to precede announcements of discontinued operations.

7.4. Empirical results for the control variables
We include seven (eight) control variables in our logit models for
the matched (unconstrained) sample. Parameter estimates for these
factors are given in Table 2. The results conform to our expectations. In
the model based on the matched sample, ﬁrms are 6% or 7% more
likely to discontinue an operation if their returns on assets for the three
prior years (ROA) are one standard deviation below average (though
the results are notably weaker when using the unconstrained sample).
Enterprises where ﬁnancial leverage (LEV) is one standard deviation
higher ten average are about 1.5% or 2% more liable to divest a unit
(the eﬀect is much stronger for ﬁrms that discontinue a negative-valued
operation for speciﬁcation based on the unconstrained sample). As
expected, ﬁrms with lower values of Tobin's Q in recent years (TOBINQ)
are more likely to discontinue an operation. The economic eﬀects

10
However, this is a case where the average marginal eﬀect takes the opposite sign. Ai
and Norton (2003) note that this can often occur for parameter estimates for interactive
variables in a logistic regression setting.
11
The results are available from the authors on request.
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support to the contentions of Weston (1989) and Bergh (1997), that
many divestitures are sales of unwanted assets following major
acquisitions. When large ﬁrms make major acquisitions, they dispose
of positive-valued units for up to a year after the purchase. Again, this is
supported by anecdotal evidence in Google's actions following its
acquisition of Motorola Mobility. Interestingly, for two further years,
large companies are less likely than control ﬁrms to dispose of negativevalued assets following acquisitions of greater magnitude.
There are also other noteworthy diﬀerences between the large and
small ﬁrms. First, in the summary statistics at the bottom of Table 4, it
is clear that bigger companies are more likely to announce positivevalued discontinued operations. These represent about 46% of divestitures by large ﬁrms, and 40% for small enterprises.12

suggest that companies with low relative equity values are particularly
liable to dispose of a negative-valued operation, while smaller ﬁrms,
based on relative revenues (CDF-REV), are far more likely to discontinue an operation. This is even the case in the matched sample where
we make an attempt to control for ﬁrm size and for this reason,
purposely choose a matching criterion other than revenues. To account
for possible interactions with other restructuring activities, we also
include a dummy variable set to one if the company announces a special
item in the current or prior three years (SPI). The parameter estimates
on this variable are positively statistically signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁcance level, and the marginal eﬀects for the matched sample results
suggest that ﬁrms that discontinue operations are about 20% more
likely to have reported other restructuring activities.
We employ two dummy variables derived from the Altman Z-Scores,
which capture the probability of bankruptcy risks. The parameter
estimates for these two factors are highly signiﬁcant. They show that
ﬁrms that meet Altman's deﬁnition of danger of bankruptcy (DANGER)
are over 5% more likely to discontinue an operation at a 1%
signiﬁcance level. The results are even stronger for enterprises that fall
in the “safe” zone (SAFE). The marginal eﬀects in the matched sample
speciﬁcation suggest that ﬁrms safe from bankruptcy are about 12%
less liable to make a divestiture. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that operating
performance is a critical determinant of decisions to divest assets.
We are also interested in the eﬀect of macroeconomic conditions on
the decision to discontinue operations. Therefore, we employ the
annual change in real per capita GDP (CHRPCGDP) to capture these
eﬀects. Because the matched sample is selected by year, we cannot
incorporate a time-related variable in that speciﬁcation, but we do
include it in the model using the unconstrained sample. We ﬁnd some
evidence that discontinuations are more common when the economy is
slow or declining. This is contrary to the predictions of Shleifer and
Vishny' (1992) Liquidity Hypothesis. But, the economic eﬀects show
that the relationship is not very powerful, which is somewhat similar to
the ﬁndings of Duhaime and Grant (1984) and Ilmakunnas and Topi
(1999).

7.6. Robustness checks
We conduct a series of sensitivity analyses to ensure that our
empirical results are robust. We executed the model using the variables
to test each of our hypotheses in isolation (D-ACQ, L1D-ACQ, L2D-ACQ
and L3D-ACQ for Hypothesis 1A, ACQ-REV, L1ACQ-REV, L2ACQ-REV
and L3ACQ-REV for Hypothesis 1B, HI for Hypothesis 2, and HI-INC,
HI-DEC and HI-DEC-SUN for Hypotheses 3A and 3B). In all four of the
speciﬁcations, we obtain very similar results for the parameter estimates on the variables to test the hypotheses and for those on the
explanatory factors. In addition, instead of using the dummy variable to
capture the change in recent diversiﬁcation, we employ the continuous
value itself. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that discontinue an operation are most
likely to be decreasing diversity in the recent past, which is sensible
given our results in Table 2. The other results are little changed.
In their study, John and Ofek (1995) use the number of segments as
an alternative measure of corporate diversity. Therefore, we also
estimate models using measures based upon the number of and changes
in the number of segments for a ﬁrm over the prior three years in place
of those based on the Herﬁndahl Index. In all of these speciﬁcations, we
again ﬁnd clear evidence that more diverse ﬁrms are more likely to
discontinue operations. In general, there is also support for our earlier
ﬁndings that divestitures are more common when diversiﬁcation has
been changing in the recent past; either increasing or decreasing. But,
the results are weaker and more inconsistent than when the dummy
variables to capture these changes are based on the Herﬁndahl Index. In
particular, the estimates of the marginal eﬀects for the Logit models
imply that changes in the number of segments have a less pronounced
eﬀect on the decision to discontinue an operation. These results suggest
that changes in the Herﬁndahl Index capture a more subtle adjustment
in the extent of corporate diversiﬁcation than mere changes in the
number of segments.
We also subdivide the sample with respect to ﬁve parameters to see
if these have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the hypothesis tests. In all cases, we
use the matching criteria described above to select a control ﬁrm from
the same subclass for each entity that discontinues an operation in the
subsamples. Because, in 2002, FASB promulgated SFAS No. 144, which
instituted a signiﬁcant change in the deﬁnition of discontinued operations,13 we split the sample into observations before and after (inclusive) 2002. Second, because we ﬁnd a strong interrelationship
between discontinued operations and other non-recurring items, we
also divide the sample depending upon whether or not a ﬁrm reported
any special items in the concurrent or three previous years. This meant
that we had to remove the dummy variable to capture this eﬀect (SPI)
from the two models. Third, we also split the ﬁrms into three categories

7.5. Logistic regression model estimates based on ﬁrm size
We also separate the sample based on ﬁrm size. Because our
explanatory variable is the cumulative density function of annual
revenues for all ﬁrms listed on the nine major North American
exchanges, REV-CDF, it is simple to divide the sample above and below
the average. These speciﬁcations produce some interesting diﬀerences,
mainly regarding the relative magnitude of current and prior acquisitions on the decision to discontinue operations, which is presented in
Table 4.
The estimates for ﬁrms of above average size are given in the lefthand panel, and for the smaller ﬁrms in the right-hand panel. There is
clearly little diﬀerence in the parameter estimates on the explanatory
variables describing corporate diversiﬁcation (HI, HI-INC, HI-DEC and
HI-DEC-SUN), the dummy variables for current and prior acquisitions
(D-ACQ, L1D-ACQ, L2D-ACQ and L3D-ACQ) and the control variables
(ROA, LEV, TOBINQ, CDF-REV, DANGER, SAFE and D-SPI) between the
two subsamples. These results are all consistent with our main ﬁndings
concerning Hypotheses 1A, 2, 3A and 3B reported above.
There are, however, sharp contrasts on the variables explaining
Hypothesis 1B, concerning the relative magnitudes of past acquisitions.
For the small ﬁrms, none of the variables measuring the size of previous
acquisitions against revenues (ACQ-REV, L1ACQ-REV, L2ACQ-REV or
L3ACQ-REV) are statistically signiﬁcant. But, among the larger ﬁrms,
most are. For these major companies, there are signiﬁcantly positive
relationships between positive-valued discontinued operations and
acquisitions in the present (ACQ-REV) and prior year (L1ACQ-REV).
On the other hand, the large ﬁrms are less prone to make a negativevalued discontinuation in the second (L2ACQ-REV) and third years
(L3ACQ-REV) after a larger acquisition. These results lend strong

12
There are 3862 reports of negative-valued discontinued operation and 3343 with
positive-values for large ﬁrms, but for small ﬁrms, these ﬁgures are 3239 and 2182,
respectively.
13
Barua et al. (2010) and Curtis et al. (2014) provide interesting results concerning
earnings management based on regulatory changes in reporting of discontinued operations.
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Table 4
Multinomial logistic regression parameter estimates samples based on ﬁrm size.
Variable

Intercept
D-ACQ
D-L1ACQ
D-L2ACQ
D-L3ACQ
ACQ-REV
L1ACQ-REV
L2ACQ-REV
L3ACQ-REV
HI
HI-INC
HI-DEC
HI-DEC-SUN
ROA
LEV
TOBINQ
CDF-REV
DANGER
SAFE
D-SPI

Class

Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO
Neg DO
Pos DO

Large ﬁrms

Small ﬁrms

Parameter estimate

Standard error

1.0277
−1.3234
−0.1787
−0.0648
0.1582
0.1189
0.2535
0.2272
0.3411
0.3159
0.1764
0.5891
0.1922
0.4821
−0.2930
−0.0886
−0.4351
−0.2751
−1.0526
−0.7968
0.8248
1.3993
0.5294
0.5798
−0.1814
0.2736
−5.4899
−5.2313
0.2328
0.7244
−0.2308
−0.1181
−1.8749
−0.5788
0.3082
0.1425
−0.2593
−0.1017
0.3931
0.5007
Observations
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Max rescale
R-square

0.2078⁎⁎⁎
0.2182⁎⁎⁎
0.0546⁎⁎⁎
0.0568
0.0574⁎⁎
0.0600⁎⁎
0.0568⁎⁎⁎
0.0594⁎⁎⁎
0.0535⁎⁎⁎
0.0559⁎⁎⁎
0.1828
0.1689⁎⁎⁎
0.1870
0.1785⁎⁎⁎
0.1453⁎⁎
0.1313
0.1469⁎⁎⁎
0.1418⁎
0.1290⁎⁎⁎
0.1328⁎⁎⁎
0.0791⁎⁎⁎
0.0845⁎⁎⁎
0.0907⁎⁎⁎
0.1041⁎⁎⁎
0.0887⁎⁎
0.0982⁎⁎⁎
0.3803⁎⁎⁎
0.3901⁎⁎⁎
0.1201⁎
0.1110⁎⁎⁎
0.0335⁎⁎⁎
0.0316⁎⁎⁎
0.1662⁎⁎⁎
0.1751⁎⁎⁎
0.0631⁎⁎⁎
0.0672⁎⁎
0.0559⁎⁎⁎
0.0579⁎
0.0639⁎⁎⁎
0.0703⁎⁎⁎

Marginal eﬀect

−0.0426
−0.0265
0.0313
0.0199
0.0549
0.0470
0.0753
0.0677
0.0320
0.0976
0.0349
0.0799
−0.0532
−0.0147
−0.0790
−0.0456
−0.1912
−0.1320
0.1591
0.2187
0.0712
0.0776
−0.0783
0.0043
−0.9973
−0.8669
0.0423
0.1200
−0.0419
−0.0196
−0.3406
−0.0959
0.0241
0.0329
−0.0818
−0.0586
0.1677
0.1919
14,410
3862
3343
7205

Economic eﬀect

0.0053
0.0163
0.0103
0.0045
−0.0025
−0.0089
−0.0073
−0.0125
−0.0513
−0.0354

−0.0815
−0.0708
0.0100
0.0283
−0.0391
−0.0183
−0.0471
−0.0133

0.2191

Parameter estimate

Standard error

− 0.7511
− 1.1736
− 0.1428
0.0083
0.1503
0.0333
0.3259
0.3457
0.5454
0.5086
0.0185
0.0655
− 0.0320
− 0.0466
− 0.0258
− 0.0120
− 0.0220
− 0.0367
− 0.8524
− 0.9462
1.4742
1.6192
1.0632
0.8102
− 0.2038
0.0254
− 0.6568
− 0.7601
0.0659
0.1141
− 0.0686
− 0.0620
− 0.1072
− 1.1730
0.4734
0.4013
− 0.7199
− 0.4578
0.4948
0.6927
Observations
Neg DO
Pos DO
No DO
Max rescale
R-square

0.2199⁎⁎⁎
0.2408⁎⁎⁎
0.0676⁎⁎
0.0741
0.0667⁎⁎
0.0751
0.0647⁎⁎⁎
0.0719⁎⁎⁎
0.0635⁎⁎⁎
0.0707⁎⁎⁎
0.0477
0.0420
0.0380
0.0391
0.0419
0.0428
0.0362
0.0524
0.1940⁎⁎⁎
0.2094⁎⁎⁎
0.0880⁎⁎⁎
0.0954⁎⁎⁎
0.0908⁎⁎⁎
0.1046⁎⁎⁎
0.1024⁎⁎
0.1156
0.1046⁎⁎⁎
0.1066⁎⁎⁎
0.0452
0.0428⁎⁎⁎
0.0135⁎⁎⁎
0.0138⁎⁎⁎
0.1988
0.2223⁎⁎⁎
0.0765⁎⁎⁎
0.0878⁎⁎⁎
0.0735⁎⁎⁎
0.0837⁎⁎⁎
0.0628⁎⁎⁎
0.0739⁎⁎⁎

Marginal eﬀect

− 0.0788
− 0.0660
− 0.0181
− 0.0464
0.0253
0.0206
0.0667
0.0541
0.0035
0.0098
− 0.0060
− 0.0070
− 0.0048
− 0.0018
− 0.0041
− 0.0055
− 0.1596
− 0.1421
0.2092
0.1936
0.1385
0.0945
− 0.1032
− 0.0755
− 0.1230
− 0.1142
0.0123
0.0171
− 0.0130
− 0.0093
− 0.0201
− 0.1311
0.0993
0.0961
− 0.1704
− 0.1460
0.1728
0.2234
10,842
3239
2182
5421

Economic eﬀect

0.0076
0.0027
− 0.0043
− 0.0049
− 0.0028
− 0.0010
− 0.0027
− 0.0036
− 0.0345
− 0.0307

− 0.0526
− 0.0488
0.0089
0.0123
− 0.0383
− 0.0278
− 0.0028
− 0.0183

0.2651

⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎
⁎

Signiﬁcant with 1% conﬁdence.
Signiﬁcant with 5% conﬁdenc.
Signiﬁcant with 10% conﬁdence.

results remain very similar to those presented in Table 2. Collectively,
the various diﬀerent variables, model speciﬁcations and subsamples
that we employ, all conﬁrm our main results. Collectively, these
sensitivity tests provide further assurance of our ﬁndings.

based on the classes associated with the Altman Z-Scores: Safe, Ignore
and Danger. Again, this meant that the dummy variables SAFE and
DANGER had to be removed from the models. Fourth, we separate the
sample into two groups one with R & D spending and the other with no
R & D spending. Fifth, we split the sample into one with and the other
without acquisitions, requiring that the associated variables be dropped
from the models. Based on all ﬁve of these divisions of the sample, there
is little diﬀerence in the signs or statistical signiﬁcance of the (remaining) parameter estimates between the subclasses.
In addition, we include industry and year dummy variables in
versions of our unconstrained model. The industry dummy variables are
based on the Fama-French ﬁfty sector classiﬁcation. Because the change
in GDP varies over time, we cannot include year dummies in the model
including this variable, but we do include the industry variables. In the
second speciﬁcation, we drop the economic control variable, and
include both industry and year dummy variables. In both cases, the

8. Summary and conclusions
In this study, we examine the eﬀects of acquisitions and corporate
focus on decisions to discontinue operations. Concentrating on these
announcements allows us to employ a larger sample than is found in
most previous empirical work on divestitures. Because reports of
discontinued operations take both negative and positive values, we
are also able to provide some insight into the quality of the divested
assets. We use a series of multinomial logistic regression models to test
our three hypotheses.
We ﬁnd that decisions to discontinue operations are highly corre-
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contraction or expansion. We ﬁnd clear evidence that ﬁrms that have
either diversiﬁed or contracted in the past three years are more liable to
discontinue an operation. The typical divestiture is most likely to be a
continuation of previous sharpening of corporate focus. But, when we
examine a smaller sample of ﬁrms that announce only a single
discontinued expansion, these companies are most likely to have
expanded in recent years. These results suggest that once managers
determine that their ﬁrm is over-diversiﬁed, they often begin a series of
divestitures seeking to move to a more manageable operating scale.
Although it is not one of our fundamental hypotheses, we are the
ﬁrst to show that ﬁrms facing low bankruptcy risk are less likely to
discontinue operations, and those in serious danger of failure are more
liable to do so. These results are especially strong among small ﬁrms.
This ﬁnding suggests that divestiture announcements contain useful
information for investors about increased risk of bankruptcy.
Overall, we ﬁnd interesting and compelling evidence on how
corporate focus and acquisitions aﬀect decisions to discontinue operations. Concentrating on discontinued operations, which are announced
in public accounting statements, allows us to employ a far broader
sample of divestitures than most previous empirical studies. We provide
some noteworthy evidence on diﬀerences between ﬁrms that divest
positive and negative-valued units. As expected, disposals tend to
follow acquisitions, and among larger ﬁrms, positive-valued divestitures occur immediately after the purchase, and negative-valued
disposals are less likely in later years. More widely-diversiﬁed ﬁrms
are more prone to discontinue operations, and the divestitures seem to
occur in sequences once a manager realizes a ﬁrm is over- diversiﬁed,
setting oﬀ a search for a more optimal corporate con1uration.

lated with recent acquisitions. Firms are much less likely than the
control sample to dispose of negative-valued assets in the year that they
make an acquisition. They are far more likely to announce both positive
and negative-valued discontinued operations in the second and third
years after an acquisition. The ﬁndings reinforce the notion that
divestitures tend to follow acquisitions, and establishes that not all
are failures, as the disposal of positive-valued assets is almost as
common as those of negative-valued assets.
There are distinct diﬀerences on how the magnitude of an acquisition aﬀects decisions to divest assets between ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
Among small companies, the scale of the acquisition has little eﬀect on
current or future divestitures. However, large ﬁrms are far more prone
to discontinue positive-valued operations in the year of or the year after
an acquisition, and are less likely to announce negative-valued divestitures in the second or third years following. Collectively, the results on
the variables concerning acquisitions correspond with the notion that
most divestitures immediately following an acquisition are unwanted
but valuable assets, and those following later are generally less valuable
units.
As expected, we ﬁnd strong evidence in support of the Corporate
Focus Hypothesis, where highly diversiﬁed ﬁrms are more likely to
dispose of assets. Earlier empirical work ﬁnds such a result for public
announcements of divestitures, but we show that the same motives lead
to the more numerous announcements of discontinued operation. Our
ﬁndings conﬁrm the hypothesis that over diversiﬁcation can lead to
managerial ineﬃciency and misallocation of internal resources, and
suggests that divestitures sharpen corporate focus.
We are the ﬁrst to examine the implications of where announcements of discontinued operations occur in the cycle of corporate
Appendix A. Deﬁnition of variables

DO-CHOICE Tertiary variable depending on whether a ﬁrm announces a discontinued operation [DO] with either a positive or negative value,
or does not report.
D-ACQ
Dummy variable set to one if a ﬁrm announces an acquisition [AQC] in the year.
D-L1ACQ
Dummy variable set to one if a ﬁrm announces an acquisition [AQC] in the prior year.
D-L2ACQ
Dummy variable set to one if a ﬁrm announces an acquisition [AQC] two years prior.
D-L3ACQ
Dummy variable set to one if a ﬁrm announces an acquisition [AQC] three years prior.
ACQ-REV
The ratio of acquisitions to revenues in the year. [AQC / REVT]
L1ACQ-REV The ratio of acquisitions to revenues in the prior year. [AQC / REVT]
L2ACQ-REV The ratio of acquisitions to revenues two years prior. [AQC / REVT]
L3ACQ-REV The ratio of acquisitions to revenues three years prior. [AQC / REVT]
HI
Herﬁndahl Index measure of corporate diversiﬁcation based on the sum of the squared values of the ratio of divisional sales [SALES
from the historical Segments Database] to total ﬁrm sales averaged over the prior three years.
HI-INC
Dummy variable set to one if the Herﬁndahl Index for the ﬁrm increases over the prior three years. Signiﬁes a decrease in corporate
diversiﬁcation.
HI-DEC
Dummy variable set to one if the Herﬁndahl Index for the ﬁrm decreases over the prior three years. Signiﬁes an increase in
corporate diversiﬁcation.
HI-DEC-SUN Dummy variable set to one if the Herﬁndahl Index for the ﬁrm decreases over the prior three years and the entity was completely
undiversiﬁed four years before (diversiﬁcation cannot decrease for such companies).
ROA
Return on assets averaged over the prior three years. [NI / AT]
LEV
Ratio of total liabilities to assets averaged over the prior three years. [LT / AT]
TOBINQ
Ratio of the sum of the end-of-ﬁscal-year market-value of equity and the book-value of preferred stock and liabilities to the bookvalues of assets averaged over the prior three years. [((CSHO ∗ PRCC_F) + PSTK + LT) / AT]
CDF-REV
Percentage of ﬁrms traded on major exchanges with lower values of revenue [REVT] under the cumulative density function for the
prior year
SPI
Dummy variable set to one if special items [SPI] are non-zero in the current or the prior three years.
DANGER
Dummy variable set to one if the estimated Altman-Z Factor for the ﬁrm for that year is below the speciﬁed “Danger” threshold.
Dummy variable set to one if the estimated Altman-Z Factor for the ﬁrm for that year is above the speciﬁed “Safe” threshold.
SAFE
CHRPCGDP Is the percentage change in real per capita Gross Domestic Product for the year. [Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics]
Variables to calculate Altman Z-factor
WC/TA
Ratio of net working capital to total assets for the year. [(ACT − LCT) / AT]
RE/TA
Ratio of retained earnings to total assets for the year. [RE / AT]
EBIT/TA
Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets for the year. [OIADP / AT]
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REV/TA
BVEQ/
BVLIAB

Ratio of revenues to total assets for the year. [REVT / AT]
Ratio of market value of equity to liabilities for the year. [(CSHO ∗ PRCC_F) / LT]

Compustat variable names shown in squared brackets.
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